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ADMIRALTY - ENVIRONMENTAL LAW - OIL SPILL LIABIL
ITY - FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CON'l'ROL ACT DOES
NOT PREEMPT STATE STATUTES IMPOSING UNUMITED
STRICT LIABILITY. STEUART TRANSPORTATION CO. u.
ALLIED TOWING CORP., 596 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1979).
On February 2, 1976, an oil barge sank in the Chesapeake Bay,
spilling oil over oyster beds and along the Virginia shoreline. 1
Although combined federal and state damages claimed for cleaning
up the pollution barely exceeded one-half million dollars, 2 the spill
resulted in the decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in Steuart Transportation Co. v. Allied Towing Corp. 3
The court's decision is significant because it could have a direct
bearing on what would happen were a supertanker disaster to occur
off the Atlantic Coast and spread oil over the ecologically important
marshlands or the economically important beach resorts of Maryland. 4
In Steuart, the Fourth Circuit held that the unlimited strict
liability provision of Virginia's oil pollution statute 5 was not
preempted by the damage ceilings of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (FWPCA).6 Thus, Virginia was able to recover all its
costs for cleaning up the oil, even though the federal government's
recovery was limited to the amount permitted by the FWPCA.7
The decision resolves one of the two questions raised in dicta but
not decided by the United States Supreme Court in Askew v.

1. Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609, 612 (4th Cir. 1979), aff'g
In re Steuart Transp. Co., 435 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Va. 1977).

2.Id.
3. 596 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1979).
4. The financial impact of the pollution caused by an oil supertanker disaster was
demonstrated when the Amoco Cadiz broke up off the coast of Brittany, France
in 1978. More than one and a half million barrels of oil were spilled across
hundreds of miles of coastline in the worst oil pollution incident in history. See
H. BAER, ADMIRALTY LAw OF THE SUPREME COURT §27-1, at 694-95 (3d ed.
1979) [hereinafter cited as BAER]. Damage claims may exceed two billion dollars,
and the disaster has spawned, according to a maritime law professor, "the
admiralty case of the century." See Kiechel, The Admiralty Case of the Century,
FORTUNE, April 23, 1979, at 78 [hereinafter cited as FORTUNE]'
5. 1973 Va. Acts ch. 417 (formerly VA. CODE §62.1-44.34:2). The act as passed in
1973 had no limitation or ceiling upon liability. The act has been amended since
the incident at issue in Steuart and now imposes a limit of five million dollars on
the liability of a shipowner for a single discharge of oil. See VA. CODE
§ 62.1-44.34:2(B) (Supp. 1979).
6. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1321(f)(1) (1976 & Supp. 1977). The first federal statute
specifically dealing with oil pollution was the Oil Pollution Act of 1924. 33 U.S.C.
§§ 431-437 (1964). Subsequently, Congress passed the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91 (1970), and amended it creating
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 &
Supp. 1977). The FWPCA was subsequently amended by the Clean Water Act of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977).
7. 596 F.2d at 613.

114

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 9

American Waterways Operators, Inc. 8 The Askew decision left
unanswered whether state statutes imposing strict liability for oil
pollution damage would be subject to the FWPCA limitations on
damage recovery. Also undecided was whether the Limitation of
Liability Act 9 would protect shipowners from unlimited liability to a
state. 10
Maryland has a strict liability statute similar to Virginia's.H
The holding of Steuart indicates that in the event of oil pollution in
Maryland waters, the state could recover its total cost of cleaning up
the oil. The question of the Limitation of Liability Act's effect upon
state statutes remains unresolved because the shipowner in Steuart
could not qualify for the benefit of the Act. Resolution of this issue
will determine whether shipowners who qualify under the Act can
nonetheless be held strictly liable for unlimited damages under state
statutes. This casenote explores the background of the statutory
confusion clarified in part by Steuart, and predicts that the
Limitation of Liability Act will limit recoveries under state strict
liability statutes.
I. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND

A.

General Maritime Law

Admiralty jurisdiction in the United States is expressly granted
by the Constitution to the federal courts,12 and extends by statute to
all navigable waters,13 and to damage done to land by vessels.H The
8. 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
9. 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-195 (1976).
10. In Askew, the Supreme Court was not faced with a governmental attempt to
recover damages for oil pollution caused by a vessel. The Court, therefore, did not
have a case or controversy before it that required the determination of these two
issues. Justice Douglas posed the two questions in dicta. 411 U.S. 325, 332 (1973).
11. Compare MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §8-1401 to -1417 (Supp. 1979) with VA.
CODE § 62.1-44.34:2 (Supp. 1979). Both the Maryland and the Virginia statutes
are strict liability statutes.
12. "The judicial power shall extend to ... all Cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
13. See De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3,776), the landmark
case in which Justice Story established the broad range of maritime law in the
United States and the jurisdiction of the federal courts in maritime matters.
Specifically, De Lovio held that admiralty jurisdiction in tort extended to all
navigable waters and in contract to all contracts relating to navigation.
Furthermore, De Lovio held that when the United States Constitution was
adopted, admiralty and maritime jurisdiction was not limited by English
statutes that had narrowed its range in England. Consequently, admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction in the United States was to be what it was prior to the
Statutes of Richard II, 13 Rich. II 1, c.5 (1389); 15 Rich. 112, c.3 (1391), providing
jurisdiction over "all transactions and proceedings relative to commerce and
navigation, and to damages or injuries upon the sea." 7 F. Cas. at 441. Justice
Story's conclusion was subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court in Insurance
Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1 (1870). See also N. HEALY & D. SHARPE,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMIRALTY 1-10 (2d ed. 1974).
14. Extension of Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1976). Historically, admiralty
jurisdiction did not extend to damage caused by ships to the shore or to shore
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United States has adopted the whole of the general maritime law,
not solely that of Great Britain. Is In addition, Congress may alter or
supplement the nation's maritime law. I6 A major principle of
maritime law is uniformity, the objective of which is to ensure that
maritime commerce is not hampered by a myriad of conflicting local,
state, and nationallawsY In the United States, however, individual
states are permitted to regulate certain maritime matters, usually
when the concern is local and no general federal maritime law exists
affecting the area. I8 There are questions as to how much of its
admiralty power Congress may constitutionally delegate to the
states. l9 In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has been less
willing to find conflicts between state and federal laws and more
willing to allow the states to exercise police powers in regard to
maritime matters,a! so long as no direct conflict with federal law
arises. 21 Thus, state legislation and regulation in a narrow range of
maritime matters has been permitted.

15.
16.

17.
18.

19.

20.
21.

facilities, but Congress extended the admiralty jurisdiction to include such cases
by way of this statute. The statute has been upheld as constitutional. See Victory
Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 209-11 (1971); Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S.
Corp., 373 U.S. 206, 209-10 (1963).
See note 13 supra. Justice Story made repeated references to the uniformity and
international character of maritime law and that these principles were adopted
by the United States Constitution.
Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 386 (1924) (holding that the Constitution
empowered Congress to alter, qualify, or supplement the maritime rules).
See note 13 supra. See also G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAw OF ADMIRALTY
§§ 1-1 to 1-19 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE & BLACK].
See, e.g., Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955)
(holding that when no definition of "warranties" in marine insurance policies
exists, federal courts should not create one, but should use state definitions
instead).
See Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 224 U.S. 205 (1917) (interpreting article three,
section two of the Constitution to give Congress exclusive power over admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction which the Congress should not delegate to the states).
Contra, Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973)
(denying the contention that a Florida oil pollution statute was preempted by the
Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, and reversing a district court decision
that quoted Jensen in supporting the contention). See American Waterways
Operators, Inc. v. Askew, 335 F. Supp. 1241 (M.D. Fla. 1971). See aLso, Scherr,
Admiralty's Power in re Oil Pollution: The Ability of the State to Set More
Stringent Penalties Than Those of the Federal Government, 7 NAT. RES. LAw.
635 (1974).
See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (state statute
regulating smoke emitted by vessel held to be valid exercise of state police
power).
Even if Congress has not completely foreclosed state legislation in a
particular area, a state statute is void to the extent that it actually
conflicts with a valid federal statute. A conflict will be found "where
compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility" ... or where the state "law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978).
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B. The Limitation of Liability Act
In 1851, Congress enacted the Limitation of Liability Act 22 on
behalf of American shipowners, who did not have the protection
from in personam suits enjoyed by their British competitors.23
British admiralty courts had only in rem jurisdiction and thus,
under British law, a shipowner's liability for damages caused by his
ship was limited to its value. 24 The theory was that a shipowner
should not be held personally liable for the actions of his ship over
which he had no control. The Act, therefore, allows a shipowner to
limit his liability to the post-casualty value of the ship plus freight
then pending if he can prove an absence of "privity or knowledge"
concerning the negligence that led to the 10ss.25 Although a potent
weapon for shipowners desiring to avoid liability, the Act has drawn
a barrage of criticism in recent years. 26 American courts in this
century have been increasingly reluctant to allow shipowners the
protection of the Act because, with the prevalence of corporate forms
preventing personal liability and modern insurance protection, the
protective objective of the Act seems obsolete. 27 Another reason for
22. 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1976).
23. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 17, at § 10-2.
24. Id. See also 2 AM. JUR. 2d Admiralty § 1-2 (1962).
25.
The liability of the owner of any vessel . . . for any loss, damage or
injury by collision, or for any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage or
forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred, without the privity or knowledge of such owner or owners, shall not ... exceed the amount or value
of the interest of such owner in such vessel, and her freight then
pending.
46 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
As used in the statute, the meaning of the words 'privity or knowledge,'
evidently is a personal participation of the owner in some fault, or act of
negligence, causing or contributing to the loss, or some personal
knowledge or means of knowledge, of which he is to avail himself of a
contemplated loss, without adopting appropriate means to prevent it.
Lord v. Goodall, Nelson & Perkins S.S. Co., 15 F. Cas. 884, 887 (C.C. Cal. 1877)
(No. 8,506) (emphasis added), aff'd, 102 U.S. (12 Otto) 541 (1881). See also,
Daniels v. Trawler Sea·Rambler, 294 F. Supp. 228 (E.D. Va. 1968); 3 E. BENEDICT,
ADMIRALTY §§41-47 (7th ed. 1975); GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 17, at §§ 10-1
to 10-49; Volk & Cobbs, Limitation of Liability, 51 TUL. L. REV. 953 (1977). The
effect of the Limitation of Liability Act is to limit the vessel owner's liability by
establishing a fund (or maximum liability ceiling) that represents the total
amount of money against which claims can be made by creditors ofthe vessel or
those damaged by the vessel's operation.
26. See In re Porter, 272 F. Supp. 282, 285 (S.D. Tex. 1967) (for a collection of works
and commentaries criticizing the Act); GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 17, at
821-24.
27. The Supreme Court said in 1954 that "[m]any of the conditions in the shipping
industry which induced the 1851 Congress to pass the Act no longer prevail."
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 437 (1954).
Such an attitude reflects, it is suggested, not so much hostility to the
shipping industry as a recognition of the fact that the Limitation Act,
passed in the era before the corporation had become the standard form of
business organization and before present forms of insurance protection
(such as Protection and Indemnity insurance) were available, shows
increasing signs of economic obsolescence.
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 17, § 10-4, at 822.
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this reluctance is the development of modem communications
allowing a shipowner to have direct control over his ships much of
the time. 28
In application, the Act can result in absurd consequences, as it
did in 1967 when the supertanker Torrey Canyon broke up off of
Land's End, England, causing millions of dollars of damage to the
beaches of England and France. The shipowner, in preliminary
proceedings in a United States District Court, was able to obtain
approval for a liability fund of fifty dollars, which represented the
value of one salvaged lifeboat.29 There was an eventual cash
settlement of about three million British pounds, but much of the
cost of the disaster was borne by England and France. 30
In addition, the Act has been employed by yacht owners to limit
their liability.31 Commentators have pointed out the irony of the use
of the statute, designed to encourage maritime commerce, by
pleasure boat owners despite their ownership of substantial liability
insurance. 32 Yacht owners wealthy enough to hire someone else to
run their vessels can avoid either "privity or knowledge" and thus
utilize the Act to avoid in personam liability. Such an owner enjoys a
freedom from liability under the Act unrelated to any legitimate
maritime purpose. 33
C.

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act

The Torrey Canyon disaster spawned an international effort to
provide compensation for the cost of cleaning up oil spills.
International conventions were drafted 34 and the shipping industry
28. See In re Den Norske Amerikalinje AlS, 276 F. Supp. 163 (N.D. Ohio 1967), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. United States Steel Corp. v. Fuhrman, 407 F.2d 1143
(6th Cir. 1969) (shipowner held to a duty to wield operational control over vessel
because of presence of radio equipment on the vessel). Contra, Yolk & Cobbs,
Limitation of Liability, 51 TUL. L. REV. 953, 960 (1977) (pointing out that a vessel
owner capable of radio contact with his ship at sea is in the unenviable position
of either attempting to exercise operational control of a ship at sea in an
emergency situation via radio communications or sitting by and assuming
liability for such failure).
29. In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 281 F. Supp. 228 (S.D. N.Y. 1968), modified, 406
F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1968).
30. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 17, § 10-4(b), at 824 n.131.
31. See, e.g., Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406 (1943); In re Guggenheim, 76 F. Supp. 50
(E.D.S.C. 1947).
32. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 17, at 883.
33. See, e.g., In re Porter, 272 F. Supp. 282 (S.D. Tex. 1967). See also Richards v.
Blake Builders Supply, Inc., 528 F.2d 745, 748 (4th Cir. 1975) (limitation in yacht
cases "is in conflict with our senses of justice and appropriateness").
34. International efforts began shortly after the Torrey Canyon disaster to change
international laws regarding the liability for such oil spills, and to provide for
cooperation when one occurred. The International Convention Relating to
Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties was ratified
by the United States Senate in September, 1971, see Pub. L. No. 93·248 (1974).
Ratifying nations agreed that anyone of them could take immediate steps when
threatened by oil pollution from a ship belonging to another, within certain
limits. See BAER, supra note 4, § 27-2, at 696-97.
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established its own fund for dealing with oil pollution. 3s The United
States Senate refused to ratify the most significant of these
conventions, however, believing its limitations on recovery were too
low. 3s Instead, Congress enacted the Water Quality Improvement
Act of 1970 and amended it in 1~72, creating what is now the
FWPCA. 37 The Act authorizes the development of a federal plan to
clean up oil spills and provides for recovery by the federal
government of its cleanup costS. 38 With few exceptions, liability is
absolute. 39 The Act, however, now limits the liability of inland
barges for an oil spill to $125.00 per gross ton or $125,000.00,
whichever is greater, and that of other vessels to $150.00 per gross
ton or $250,000.00, whichever is greater, so long as the discharge was
not willful. 40
The FWPCA contains two ambiguous sections, which courts
have had difficulty interpreting. One is section 1321(£)(1), which
declares that the limits established by the section are effective
against shipowners "notwithstanding any other provision of law."
Some commentators believe that the Act thus supercedes the
Limitation of Liability Act by creating new limits on liability and
thus prevents a shipowner from limiting his liability by establishing
35. In 1969 tanker owners formed a compensation plan entitled Tanker Owners'
Voluntary Agreement concerning Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (TOV ALOP). This arrangement was superceded in 1975 by the Civil Liability
Convention (CLC), an international treaty, under which shipowners have
absolute liability for oil pollution. Liability limits were established, however, and
were about $16.7 million at the time of the Amoco Cadiz sinking. A private
agreement among companies shipping oil, Contract Regarding an Interim
Supplement to Tanker Owner Liability for Oil Pollution (CRISTAL) could
provide an additional $13.3 million.
The CLC convention was not ratified by the United States Senate because
the Senate believed the limitation figures were too low. Damage estimates in the
Amoco Cadiz disaster range as high as $2 billion, and thus the existing liability
provisions are inadequate. Efforts are underway to increase the limits under the
CLC and CRISTAL plans.
Making matters more complicated for all parties are limits on insurance
policies shipowners can carry. The Amoco Cadiz was insured for only $50
million. These limits have since been raised to $100 million. It seems obvious,
however, that presently there are no existing means of providing that the cost of
such disasters be paid by those responsible. See 3 E. BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY,
§§ 115-119 (7th ed. 1975); BAER, supra note 4, at 696-99; GILMORE & BLACK,
supra note 17, § 1O-4(b); Higgins, Pollution: International Conventions, Federal
and State Legislation, 53 TUL. L. REV. 1328 (1979) (discussing proposed federal
legislation to create a "superfund").
36. See 3 E. BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY §§ 115-119 (7th ed. 1975).
37. See note 6 supra.
38. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(i)(1) (1972).
39. There is no liability if the oil spill was caused by: (1) An act of God; (2) An act of
war; (3) Negligence on the part of the United States government; or (4) An act or
omission by a third party. Id. at § 1321(f).
40. If the conduct causing the spill is determined to be "willful" the vessel owner is
subject to liability without limitation. See note 6 supra. See also Healy &
Paulsen, Marine Oil Pollution and the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 1
J. MAR. LAW & COM. 537 (1970) (the definitive work on the background of the
Act). See generally 3 E. BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY § 111 (7th ed. 1975); DOLGIN &
GUILBERT, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 682-771 (1974).
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his lack of "privity or knowledge."41 This question has not been
litigated beyond the federal district court level and the decisions
there are not definitive. 42
The other controversial section of the FWPCA is 1321(0)(2),
which states that Congress disclaims any intention to preempt state
statutes "imposing any requirement or liability with respect to the
discharge of oil." More than twenty states have statutes imposing
liability in various forms for oil spills in their waters.43 Many of
these statutes, including Maryland's, impose strict liability with no
limitation upon the amount a shipowner might have to pay a state
for cleaning up an oil spill.44 The question regarding this section is
41. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 20, § 1O-4(b); 3 E. BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY § 112
(7th ed. 1975).
42. See In re Oswego Barge Corp., 439 F. Supp. 312 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (New York
statute imposing- strict liability for oil spills held to be subject to the Limitation
of Liability Act in a case involving the grounding of an oil barge); In re Harbor
Towing Corp., 335 F. Supp. 1150 (D. Md. 1971) (subjecting Maryland's strict
liability statute to the Limitation of Liability Act). 1"1 Harbor Towing, however,
Maryland brought its action under the state's strict liability statute and the
Wreck Statute, 33 U.S.C. § 409 (1976), which requires the owner of a vessel sunk
in a "navigable channel" to mark the sunken vessel and make diligent attempts
to remove it. The possible impact upon the Wreck Statute of the FWPCA, which
had just taken effect at the time of the Harbor Towing decision, was not
considered except in an aside at the end of the opinion. The FWPCA's possible
impact on the Limitation of Liability Act was not considered in either case.
Compare United States v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D. La. 1978)
with United States v. M/V Big Sam, 454 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. La. 1978). In both
cases the issue was whether the FWPCA superceded the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act (The Refuse Act) of 1899. 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 411-412 (1970). In
MIV Big Sam, which involved a collision between a tug and a barge, the court
held that there was no conflict between the statutes and that the FWPCA did not
supercede the Refuse Act. In Dixie Carriers, which involved a similar factual
scenario, the court held that under certain situations the FWPCA did supercede
the Refuse Act. The Dixie Carriers court also determined that the FWPCA was
the federal government's exclusive remedy for the recovery of costs of an oil spill
cleanup; but that the Refuse Act could nonetheless be used to recover for
damages to property arising from an oil spill. The court in Steuart adopted the
reasoning of the court in Dixie Carriers, and held that the FWPCA was the
federal government's exclusive remedy for its costs of cleaning up an oil spill. 596
F.2d at 615.
Damage to property was not an issue in Steuart. But see In re Allied Towing
Corp., 478 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Va. 1979). In Allied Towing the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that Virginia could
impose liability upon Allied for the loss of waterfowl destroyed when another of
Allied's barges sank in the Chesapeake Bay. The court stated that "the Clean
Water Act of 1977 amendments to the FWPCA did not preempt state created
liability for oil spills, and that no part of Virginia's claim under state law for
damage to its natural resources" was satisfied by Allied's settlement with the
federal government and Allied's subsequent discharge from liability under the
FWPCA. 478 F. SuPP. at 404.
43. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1401 to -1417 (1974 & Supp. 1979). See also note
71 infra.
44.
The Maryland Port Administration and the department shall charge and
collect a compensatory fee from the person responsible for any oil
spillage. This fee shall cover the cost of labor, equipment operation, and
material necessary to eliminate the residue of oil spillage, and the cost of
restoring the area damaged by the spillage to its original condition.
MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §8-1408 (1974).
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whether by declining to preempt state statutes Congress was
protecting those statutes from the Limitation of Liability Act. This
question has never been decided by any court.

D.

The Askew Decision

Florida was one of the first states to enact strict liability
legislation governing oil SpillS,45 and the statute was quickly
challenged. 46 The federal district court declared in American
Waterways Operators, Inc. v. Askew that the state act was
unconstitutional,47 relying on the landmark case of Southern Pacific
Co. v. Jensen 48 to hold that the Florida statute conflicted with the
supremacy of federal maritime law. The court went on to note that to
allow states to regulate shipping through such statutes would
destroy the principle of uniformity.49 In addition, the district court
observed that even if the state law were authorized by the FWPCA,
such authorization would be an impermissable delegation of power
by Congress. 50
The United States Supreme Court reversed the district court in
an unanimous decision,51 holding that the statute was a valid
exercise of Florida's police power in an area not preempted by
federal law. The Court specifically declined to decide both whether
the state's costs would have to be included within the limitation of
the FWPCA and whether a shipowner could escape liability under a
state statute through use of the Limitation of Liability Act. 52 Indeed,

45. The Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act, ch. 70-244 § 12, 1970 Fla.
Laws 740 (current version at FLA. STAT. ANN. §376.12 (West Supp. 1979». For a
comprehensive study of the Florida legislation and changes that occurred
subsequent to the Askew decision when maritime interests began pulling out of
Florida (limitations on liability were eventually adopted) see Barrett & Warren,
History of Florida Oil Spill Legislation, 5 FLA. ST. L. REV. 310 (1977). See also
Maloof, Oil Pollution: Cleaning Up the Legal Mess, 43 INS. COUNSEL J. 605
(1976).
46. American Waterways Operators, Inc. v. Askew, 335 F. Supp. 1241 (M.D. Fla.
1971). The only other state pollution statute challenged in court prior to Steuart
was The Maine Coastal Conveyance of Oil Act, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 38, §§ 541-557
(Supp. 1977). For a thorough discussion of the Maine act, see Comment, Liability
for Maritime Oil Pollution, A Comparison of the Maine Coastal Conveyance Act
with Federal Liability Provisions, 29 ME. L. REV. 47 (1977). The Maine statute
was upheld by the Maine Supreme Court, and the United States Supreme Court
refused to hear the case on appeal. See Portland Pipeline Corp. v. Environmental
Improvement Comm., 307 A.2d 1 (Me. 1973), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1035
(1973).
47. 335 F. Supp. at 1250-51.
48. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
49. 335 F. Supp. at 1248.
50. Id. at 1249.
51. Askewv v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
52. Id. at 332.
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the court could not have decided these issues because Askew did not
present a factual scenario in which a state was proceeding against
the owner of a vessel to recover damages for the cost of cleaning up a
spill. In Askew, the plaintiff organization represented the interests
of licensees of oil terminal facilities. This organization requested the
federal court to enjoin the enforcement of the Florida statute,
alleging that the FWPCA preempted the Florida requirement that all
licensees of such terminal facilities carry insurance or post bonds to
show their ability to pay state damage claims in the event of an oil
spill. 53
The Askew Court considered the Solicitor General's argument
that the Limitation of Liability Act preempts the Florida statute "so
far as vessels are concerned," but reasoned that because the state
statute dealt with the regulation of terminal "facilities," not vessels,
it thus did not conflict with the Limitation of Liability Act. 54 The
decision did not mention In re Harbor Towing Corp.,55 the one lower
court decision that dealt with the effect of the Limitation of Liability
Act upon state oil pollution statutes. In Harbor Towing, Chief Judge
Northrop of the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland held that the Limitation of Liability Act preempted
Maryland's .strict liability oil pollution statute,56 and allowed the
owner of a barge that spilled oil into the Baltimore harbor to limit
his liability to $33,000.00, despite the $500,000.00 in damages caused
by the spill. 57 But the question of whether the FWPCA preempted the
Limitation of Liability Act and permitted the state full recovery was
not considered in Harbor Towing because the FWPCA had just been
enacted at the time of the decision.
The Supreme Court could not address the effect of the liability
ceilings of the FWPCA upon Florida's strict liability statute, because
in Askew there were no damages being claimed as the result of an oil
spill. Thus, there was no conflict between state claims for damages
and the federal ceilings of the FWPCA. Askew simply held that a
state could pass legislation imposing liability upon those polluting
its waters.58
53. [d. at 331. See also The Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act, supra
note 45, at § 14.
54. [d. at 331. The Court distinguished the Limitation of Liability Act's exclusive
control over damage caused by "vessels" from the Florida statute's regulation of
"facilities."
55. 335 F. Supp. 1150 (D. Md. 1971).
56. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§8-1401 to -1417 (1974 & Supp. 1979).
57. 335 F. Supp. at 1152.
58. The Askew case has been the subject of extensive commentary and criticism. The
Court could not address the major issues and had to leave unanswered a number
of questions clearly likely to cause further litigation, which they did. See
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 17, at § 10-4(b); 3 E. BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY § 113
(7th ed. 1975); Post, A Solution to the Problem of Private Compensation in Oil
Discharge Situations, 28 U. MIAMI L. REv. 524, 543-46 (1974); Sisson, Oil
Pollution Law and the Limitation of Liability Act: A Murky Sea for Claimants

122

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 9

II. THE STEUART CASE
Steuart Transportation Company's oil tank barge STC-101,
loaded with 19,700 gallons of oil 59 and in tow of Allied's tug Falcon,
sank four miles south of the Smith Point light on February 2, 1976,
causing an oil spill over miles of Chesapeake Bay oyster beds and
Virginia shoreline. Steuart sought to limit its liability by qualifying
under the Limitation of Liability Act. The trial court found, however,
that Steuart's managers and superintendents were negligent in their
inspection of the barge, and that the barge sank because of various
defective conditions that adequate inspection would have revealed. 60
Thus, the trial court held that Steuart could not establish a lack of
privity or knowledge and therefore could not limit its liability.
Steuart sought, in the alternative, the protection of the
limitation levels of the FWPCA, which at that time would have established liability at $122,300.00, computed at $100.00 per gross ton
of the barge. 61 Steuart also asked the court to combine the federal
and state cleanup costs in order to subject Virginia's, as well as the
federal government's, costs to the limits of the FWPCA. Had Steuart
been successful, the Commonwealth of Virginia would have
recovered only a pro rata portion of its expenses, because the
combined costs of $521,000.00 substantially exceeded the FWPCA
limit. The trial and appellate courts held both that Steuart's liability
to the federal government was subject to the limits of the FWPCA,62
and more importantly that Virginia's claims were outside the
FWPCA and thus not subject to the FWPCA limits.
Steuart argued that the state statute imposing unlimited strict
liability conflicted with the liability limitation of the FWPCA, thus
raising one of the questions left unanswered by Askew. 63 The Fourth
Circuit, however, relying upon the recent Supreme Court case of Ray
v. Atlantic Richfield CO.,64 applied the principle that "[fJederal
legislation does not supercede a state statute based on the police
powers unless Congress has manifested a clear intention to preempt
the field or the state statute actually conflicts with the federal
law."65 The court then discussed the legislative intent behind Section
1321(0)(2) of the FWPCA, which the court determined disclaims any

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Against Vessels, 9 J. MAR. LAw & COM. 285, 303-15 (1978; Swan, Challenges to
Federalism: State Legislation Concerning Marine Oil Pollution, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q.
437 (1972).
435 F. Supp. at 800.
[d. at 803. A worn ventilator cowling broke loose flooding the stern pump room,
and unremoved scupper plugs caused cargo hatch spill rails to retain water.
33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1) (1976). The current limit is $125.00 per gross ton for inland
barges.
Thus ruling against the federal government's contention that Steuart's
negligence was willful. See note 40 supra.
411 U.S. 325 (1973).
435 U.S. 151, 157-58 (1978).
596 F.2d at 620.
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attempt by Congress to restrict state legislation regarding oil spill
liability.66 It also dismissed as "too attenuated" Steuart's claim that
the limit of the FWPCA was imposed by Congress in order that
shipowners could obtain the insurance coverage required by the
Act. 67 The court then concluded that Virginia could recover its
cleanup costs directly from Steuart, independent of the FWPCA
limitations.
In addition, the Fourth Circuit held that Steuart could not
qualify under the Limitation of Liability Act. 68 Therefore, the Fourth
Circuit did not decide whether, had Steuart qualified, the Act would
have limited Virginia's recovery under its statute, although the court
appeared to assume that it would. 69 In contrast, the trial court had
observed in a footnote that the language "notwithstanding any
other provision of law" in the FWPCA might preclude application of
the Limitation of Liability Act to all claims for oil spill cleanup
costs. 70 The question remains unresolved by the courts.
III. THE MARYLAND STRICT LIABILITY STATUTE
The holding in Steuart indicates that, notwithstanding the
FWPCA, Maryland's strict liability statute could allow the state to
recover all the costs it incurs in cleaning up oil spilled in Maryland
waters, because the key provisions of the Maryland statute are
similar to the Virginia statute construed by the Steuart court. 71 The
statute provides in part that the Maryland Port Administration and
the Department of Natural Resources,

66.

67.

68.
69.
70.
71.

In 33 U.S.C. § 1321(0)(2), Congress expressly disclaimed any intention to
preempt the states "from imposing any requirement or liability with
respect to the discharge of oil." Congress recognized the states' primary
responsibility to eliminate pollution, and it directed the President to
prepare a national contingency plan for the removal of oil spills that
would coordinate the efforts of federal and state agencies. Having
acknowledged the importance of state efforts in this area, Congress did
not hobble the states by subjecting their claims for removal costs to the
limitation in the [Federal Water] Pollution [Control] Act. The House
conference report, commenting on § 1321(0)(2)'s antecedent in the Water
[Quality Improvement] Act, explained that a state could impose
"additional requirements and penalties" for the discharge of oil into the
waters of the state.
596 F.2d at 620 (citations omitted). See note 82 infra.
There are some commentators who believe this is not an attenuated argument.
See, e.g., Maloof, supra note 45 (present limits on insurance of oil tankers are
woefully inadequate for the potential damage an oil spill can cause).
See text accompanying note 60 supra.
596 F.2d at 615-16.
435 F. Supp. at 806 n.8. This conflicts with the argument and assumption of the
Solicitor General commented upon by the United States Supreme Court in
Askew. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§8-1401 to -1417 (1974 & Supp. 1979). More than
twenty states have similar legislation. The statutes are collected at 3 E.
BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY § 113 (7th ed. 1975).
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shall charge and collect a compensatory fee from the person
responsible for any oil spillage. This fee shall cover the cost
of labor, equipment operation, and material necessary to
eliminate the residue of oil spillage and the cost of restoring
the area damaged by the spillage to its original condition. 72
Other sections of the statute provide for a contingency fund for
cleanup expenses,73 bonds,74 and with certain exceptions, criminal
penalties. 75 The statute imposes strict civil liability on any party
responsible for an oil spill in Maryland waters and requires that
party to compensate the state in full for the state's cleanup costs.
More recently, In re Allied Towing COrp.76 takes Steuart one step
further and indicates that the restoration clause of the Maryland
statute probably will allow the state to collect damages for injury to
its natural resources resulting from an oil spill. The shadow of In re
Harbor Towing Corp.,77 however, casts doubts upon the Maryland
statute's ability to reach beyond the potentially small fund that
could be established by a vessel owner under the Limitation of
Liability Act. Thus, the effect of the Limitation of Liability Act upon
state statutes, left undecided by Askew, remains an important
undecided question following Steuart.
IV. THE REMAINING QUESTION
In Steuart, the Fourth Circuit found that Congress' intent in
enacting the FWPCA was to provide the federal government a
remedy for oil spill damage without preempting state statutes. 78 As a
result, there are now two areas of potential liability for the owner of
a vessel responsible for an oil spill. If the federal government incurs
expense, the shipowner will be liable for the government's costs up to
the FWPCA limits. Steuart implies that the "notwithstanding any
other provision of law" language of the FWPCA and its accompanying legislative history79 effectively supersedes the Limitation of
72. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §8-1408 (1974).
73. Id. at § 8-1411. The $1,000,000.00 limit, in light of the enormous potential of
damage carried by a major spill, may be too low if supertankers begin coming
closer to Maryland waters.
74.
Except for a vessel carrying or receiving 25 barrels or less of oil, any
vessel, whether or not self-propelled, in or entering upon the waters of
the state to discharge or receive a cargo of any bulk oil in the state shall
post a bond of $100 per gross ton of vessel with either the Maryland Port
Administration or the department.
Id. at § 8-1407(a).
75. Id. at § 8-1410. This section provides exceptions in cases of "emergency
imperiling life or property, unavoidable accident, collision, or stranding."
76. 478 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Va. 1979). See note 42 supra.
77. 335 F. Supp. 1150 (D. Md. 1971).
78. 596 F.2d at 620. See also, H.R. REp. No. 91-940, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 42, reprinted
in [1970] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2712, 2727.
79. 596 F.2d at 615. See also, H.R. REP. No. 91-127, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 11,
reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2691, 2702.
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Liability Act in the area of liability to the federal government.
Steuart, however, leaves undecided whether, were the same oil spill
to cause a state to incur expense, liability to the state would be
governed by state unlimited strict liability statutes, or whether the
shipowner would be able to limit liability by qualifying under the
Limitation of Liability Act. This question is critical because, without
the protection of the Limitation of Liability Act, shipowners could
face massive liability were a major oil spill to occur. With continued
reliance upon foreign oil shipped to the United States by tanker, the
likelihood of a major spill remains high. A major spill that spread
over the waters of the Chesapeake Bay, or along the Atlantic Coast,
could cause immeasurable damage to natural resources. A Torrey
Canyon or Amoco Cadiz supertanker disaster off Cape Hatterab, for
example, where many other ships have sunk, could create liability
that no shipowner could bear.
Although both Steuart and Allied Towing held that the states
could avoid the limits of the FWPCA and proceed against the vessel
owners for all the damages the states incurred, in neither case was it
settled whether the Limitation of Liability Act might limit a state's
recovery, because neither vessel owner could qualify under that Act.
Similarly, the FWPCA had only been recently enacted when Judge
Northrop found in Harbor Towing that Maryland could not recover
more than the damage ceiling imposed by the Limitation of Liability
Act. Therefore, Judge Northrop did not consider whether the
FWPCA renders the Limitation of Liability Act inapplicable to
situations in which a state sues the vessel owner. so
On one hand, the Limitation of Liability Act's declining
popularity among courts and commentators supports a prediction
that it will be found not to preempt state unlimited strict liability
statutes. Indeed, in recent years shipowners have found it increasingly difficult to establish the lack of "privity or knowledge" that is
the prerequisite to limitation of liability.81 On the other hand, an
even stronger argument can be made that the Limitation of Liability
Act will check the unlimited liability imposed by some state oil spill
statutes. Analysis of the Steuart decision and the FWPCA's
provisions suggests the Act will limit recovery under state statutes.
Steuart held that state recoveries for oil spill damages are not
limited by the FWPCA because that Act applies only to recovery by
the federal government. Inasmuch as the FWPCA provides the
federal government's sole remedy for oil spills, the Steuart court
reasoned that it necessarily must be solely a limitation on a
shipowner's federal liability. Thus, if the FWPCA applies only to the
federal government, then it logically follows that the FWPCA
superceded the Limitation of Liability Act only with respect to
liability to the federal government.
80. See note 42 supra.
81. See note 27 supra.
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Similarly, the Congressional intent manifest in section
1321(0)(2) indicates that the FWPCA does not preempt state oil spill
legislation. 82 Other language in the Act justifies the inference that it
supercedes the Limitation of Liability Act only with respect to
federal liability. Section 1321(f)(1) establishes the federal government's right to collect damages and limits the amount of recovery. In
addition, section 1321(f)(1) stipulates that it is effective "notwithstanding any other provision of law." This language can refer only
to the federal right and its limits. If the states are protected from the
limits of the FWPCA because its limits apply only to the federal
government, then whether the FWPCA supercedes the Limitation of
Liability Act as to the federal government has no relevance to the
application of the Limitation of Liability Act to state statutes.
V. CONCLUSION
Although there has been a great deal of commentary since
Askew, until Steuart no case had resolved the questions that
decision left unanswered: (1) whether the limits of the FWPCA apply
to the states, and (2) whether state recoveries may be limited by the
Limitation of Liability Act. The Fourth Circuit decided, in a wellreasoned opinion, that state recoveries are not limited by the
FWPCA. The result, at least in the Fourth Circuit, will be that
shipowners whose vessels spill oil into the waters of states that
impose strict and unlimited liability for such spills will have to pay
those states' full cleanup costs. In addition, as a result of Allied
Towing, shipowners will be responsible for damage to natural
resources, unless they are able to use the Limitation of Liability Act
to establish a fund limited to the remaining value of the vessel.
Although the federal government's recovery of its costs is
limited, and Virginia has amended its statute to provide for a limit
on liability, the Maryland statute continues to impose unlimited
liability. Consequently, in the future, Maryland may well engage in a
major legal battle to resolve whether the Limitation of Liability Act
limits state damages in oil spill cases. The Steuart decision provides
a framework for analysis of that inevitable conflict. Such analysis
leads to the conclusion that the Limitation of Liability Act retains
vitality when state strict liability statutes are applied against
shipowners. Thus, when a vessel owner has neither "privity or
knowledge," a state's recovery under its strict liability statute, no
matter how extensive the damage, might be limited to the value of a

82. See text accompanying note 66 supra. The statute provides in pertinent part as
follows: "Nothing in this section shall be construed as preempting any State ...
from imposing ... liability with respect to the discharge of oil ... into any
waters in such State." 33 U.S.C. § 1321(0)(2) (1976).
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single lifeboat, as in the Torrey Canyon disaster, under the
provisions of the 129-year old Limitation of Liability Act.

Daniel C. Riker

